Confessions of an RCO Operator

My first three days on the job as a qualified RCO were demanding and enlightening. Days one and two found me working alone. Well, actually with a non-qualified helper who was relegated to riding the locomotive all day in order to ensure that we didn't run over or into anything. Lots of walking left me physically spent but mentally ok because of the deliberate and careful pace I set for myself. Yesterday I was helper with a qualified foreman but because neither the electronic pull back protection nor the rules-defined remote control zone absolute block had been established one of us was always on the loco, this time with a box. Less walking but still the same one-man switching except we had the option of having the head end man operate the loco (by remote but in the cab of course) on the pull outs, something I prefer but which my foreman did not. He likes to be in control wherever he is. At any rate, this cut our walking in half even if it didn't significantly increase productivity.

We experienced two kinds of COM LOSS. The first is the less problematic of the two unless it occurs in great frequency or at an inopportune time. This is the recoverable COM LOSS which can be reset (by both operators) when the RCR and RCT link up again. We have experienced these in the cab of the locomotive after the initial linkup and in the field, especially when entering a dead zone (an area where radio handset communications and locomotive/EOT communications are affected). Our personal trainer even believed that the RCT transmissions might be affecting the handset communications. Yesterday, while working with two boxes, we also experienced at least 40 such recoverable COM LOSSES while I was in the cab of the loco and the foreman was attempting to switch out a 59 car track. We called for CRAPTRON tech support but they never showed up and we just limped along until we were done, on overtime and had had 3 jobs blocked for an hour or more. I think we might also have killed a train.

The second kind of COM LOSS is more problematic in that it is non-recoverable in the field. When this occurred to me the other day, I walked back toward the loco hoping that communications would be re-established but it never was and I had to shut down the RCR, reboot it, relink, and then go through all the required tests before I could move the loco. I suspect that it wouldn't have made any difference if the man on the loco had had a box since both of us would have to be there to relink and test.

There is a conspiracy theory developing, perhaps originating with the CRAPTRON techs who can't understand how their technical wonder can have so many problems and being circulated by yardmasters and managers. That is that all our COM LOSS problems are the result of violators of the FCC licensing constraints on frequency use (in Des Moines it was the state fair that arrived with lots of miscreants using third world radio equipment that stepped all over our bought-and-paid-for frequency) OR some of our own resorting to sabotage of the perfectly well engineered system. There are rumors of box antennas loosened to induce COM LOSS and jamming with Radio Shack devices. 

Interesting response to the thorny problem of dealing with INTERMITTENT breakdowns. It's not that they should have had all this worked out before introducing it in a dangerous work environment. It's simply that the problem is malcontents, law-breakers, and a regulatory agency that can't seem to do anything fast enough to satisfy these coked up techno-geeks. (and of course our own management who was quite content to hide out in their office watching TV and eating donuts before this mini-crisis but who are now undoubtedly finding motivational religion in their morning meetings and in the phone calls from other areas and beyond.)

And a few minor observations:

1. As stated before, if the loco is stopped, the secondary operator can tilt extend (overriding a safety device?) and then the primary operator can move the locomotive. If stopped the primary can tilt extend, but then he cannot move the locomotive. If either primary or secondary tilt extends, the other is barred from doing the same.

2. I was surprised to learn that you can toggle the box to display SPEED or BRAKE PIPE PRESSURE. Apparently only the primary operator can view the speed but then the secondary cannot. He can toggle to SPEED display and it does display speed but always as 0.0 mph even when moving. I also observed that while riding the lead unit (the remote unit) the speedometer was disabled. In other words, the secondary has no way of ascertaining the speed of the operation. Now aren't there some rules about the conductor (second man?) keeping an eye on the speed and asking the man in control to slow down if he is going to fast and big holing the works if he doesn't get the response he desires. How can we comply if we don't know how fast we are going?

3. Speaking of SPEED. The Speed Control Lever (the recommended way of controlling movement) obviously combines two functions in one control by means of the computer/software solution; independent braking and motive power. We have talked about HUNTING which produces a surging behavior with respect to speed. We are also very much like KAMLOOPS, a description of MICRO-COM LOSSES which are those sub-5-second COM LOSSES which don't shut down the operation but do produce loss of control (for less than 5 seconds) and thereby erratic behavior of the system which prevents operators from developing work habits that produce consistent results. We have heard numerous complaints on the order of; "I did the same thing but now I crashed into the cars (or now I stopped short)".

4. We were assured that when we set the speed control to X mph, the speed would be X mph plus or minus 0.5 mph. This is not true. A setting of 4 mph can find you cruising along at 4.9, 5.0, 5.1 mph which is about 25% over the set speed. I was shoving one car down a slight grade and bumped the speed up to 7 mph. The actual speed was more like 9 mph and even when I reduced the setting to 4 and even 1 mph the thing was sailing along at 7 mph for quite some time. I switched to STOP and we finally stopped short of catastrophe. The point is that even when you think you understand the behavior of this junk, you best take the safe course and stop well short and then proceed with caution. I hope the people observing us understand this.

And on the political front, the concern about the near melt-down conditions is starting to manifest itself. We mentioned the conspiratorial talk of saboteurs within our ranks. I also walked in on an indoctrination session being held by a UP manager for the benefit of 3 new hires. Something about having to make the best of this difficult situation in order to climb out of the hole we find ourselves in. I didn't hear it, but it was later reported to me by a participant, that he claimed that the UP had hired about 24 new people and that they would have no qualms about firing anyone (with 3 months service or 30 years) who was found to be interfering with the efficient operation of things, whether by pranks or the implied working too slow. I got into it with this manager in order to provide an alternative way of looking at this for the newbies and I couldn't draw him out to make such a statement to me. Crafty little dude. I would have been happy to report any threatening statements to the proper authorities. (As a sidelight: he promised to talk to his superiors about issuing us locks which we could used to lock out the tracks we are coupling air on. I told him what the response to that would be.)

And some tidbits. I was told we won't be able to test the pullback protection (the solution to all our problems) until we get back to normal operations (i.e.. work like crazy to clean this mess up) and that we won't be able to get back to normal operations without the pullback protection. As someone pointed out, this is a classic Catch-22 situation.

At one location. whenever I went in the office to call the yardmaster about extra cars, a few seconds later some trainmaster came running in to use the bathroom. After listening to me give the yardmaster the car numbers and then repeat the tracks he wanted me to switch them into, this trainmaster mumbled something about, "Extra cars, eh?" These guys are pretty sharp.

Today is my big opportunity to bring my expertise to the another location where they have been having their share of RCO problems. I hope to be able to help out there. Tomorrow I'll be back, but working for someone else. Should be interesting if he will talk to me.

Yesterday a brother was circulating letters which he wanted RCL users to sign. Something about understanding the nature of what they are asking us to do and affirming that this is truly engineers' work and that we don't really want to do it. He said the BLE will be taking these to Arbitration to support their position that we are in fact doing engineers work. I signed it but thought, "Good luck."

Apparently the main suspect in the most serious RCL accident to date was told in private conference that they were just going to forget the whole thing. He was also told not to mention this to anyone which, being who he is, he promptly did. Now I am relating this to you but you have to promise not to tell anyone else. It's ok to violate several rules and wreck a bunch of stuff if you are using remote technology. Still no investigations or discipline for the run-through switches either.