Questions and Answers Regarding Emergency Order No. 24


November 4, 2005


1. Why did FRA issue this Q&A document?

FRA has received comments from railroads and labor organizations requesting guidance on and relief from Emergency Order No. 24 (EO). 70 Fed. Reg. 61496 (Oct. 24, 2005). In response to these comments, FRA has decided to provide the railroads and employees additional flexibility in complying with the EO, and a notice will be published in the Federal
Register that will reflect the relief granted. As FRA will be granting additional flexibility to the railroads and the employees, we are not changing the November 22, 2005 effective date of the EO. The following information, in a question and answer format, reflects the relief to be granted in the EO’s second notice as well as further explanation of the existing EO requirements. In order to disseminate this information as quickly as possible, FRA is providing this Q&A document prior to publication of the second notice.

2. Do all railroads have a duty to act under the EO?

All railroads that have employees or contractor employees who operate hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory or dispatch trains in that type of territory have duties under this EO unless specific relief has been granted. 70 Fed. Reg. at 61500. Tourist railroads, or other railroads, that are unsure of whether FRA exercises jurisdiction over them
should reference FRA’s published statement on the extent and exercise of FRA’s safety jurisdiction. 49 CFR. Part 209, app. A. If a railroad is still unsure on this issue, please contact FRA’s Office of Chief Counsel at (202) 493-6038.

3. What is the manner of initial and periodic instruction on the EO and the relevant railroad operating rules?

Given that this is an emergency situation requiring railroads to quickly and effectively instruct employees, FRA’s expectation is that the minimum initial instruction and distribution of the EO would include one face-to-face on-the-job briefing covering the requirements of this EO and the operating rules to which they relate. In order to be effective, this job briefing must
include examples or real time applications of the EO, as well as a reasonable opportunity for employees to ask questions. Regarding periodic instruction, railroads will include this instruction as part of their program of instruction pursuant to 49 CFR. § 217.11.

4. Does a railroad have to instruct its employees again if it already has applicable operating rules that comply with this EO and has recently instructed its employees?

Yes. FRA has identified an emergency situation and wants to raise the level of awareness for all employees who operate hand-operated switches in non-signaled territory or who dispatch trains in that type of territory. In addition, it is significant for affected employees to understand that the Federal government will be able to assess civil penalties of up to $27,000
for a violation of the EO by any person. That said, FRA does not expect railroads to entirely discount prior instruction as this new instruction can build upon the prior instruction; in other words, prior instruction on an unchanged operating rule does not need to be as in-depth as it would be if the employees were being instructed on the relevant operating rules for the
first time.

5. Why is there a requirement for a written receipt of the EO by employees?

Because of the critical importance of this order and the individual accountability inherent therein, FRA must be assured that employees have received their own paper copy of the EO.

6. Can a railroad retain an electronic receipt or acknowledgment, as an alternative to a written receipt or acknowledgment, for each employee affected by the EO that indicates that the employee was provided with a copy of the EO?

Yes. FRA did not intend to preclude the creation or retention of the receipt or keeping of the acknowledgment electronically. As long as the receipt or acknowledgment is a permanent record that is kept for each affected employee and can be searched and printed for FRA upon request, electronic recordkeeping is acceptable. The electronic recordkeeping system should have system integrity, to prevent fraudulent entries, and may be added onto existing systems, e.g., those systems that already track attendance at railroad operating rules classes. If those systems do not allow employees to enter an acknowledgment, the attendance sheet at the class of instruction on the EO should reflect that the attendee’s signature reflects both attendance and receipt of a copy of the EO.

7. What is the safety benefit of the dispatcher confirming that both the conductor and engineer have initialed the switch position awareness form (SPAF)?

It is a final confirmation that both the engineer and conductor have properly recorded on the SPAF the position of all switches operated prior to releasing their authority.

8. How does the EO apply to an employee, other than a crewmember, lining a switch for a train?

Each employee operating a switch for a train must complete a SPAF for all switches operated.

9. What date should be entered on the SPAF if the tour of duty goes beyond midnight?

The date entered is the date that the tour of duty began.

10. Why should the engineer initial each entry, as opposed to only the final entry?

It encourages intra-crew communication while employees are still at each switch.

11. Can automatic relief be granted to a railroad where operating rules require trains to approach all facing point hand-operated switches prepared to stop on a line segment basis, rather than a system basis?

Yes, when the relief is predicated on a permanent application of the relevant operating rules and special instructions for the territory involved. Employees or dispatchers involved with more than one line segment may require instruction if one of the other line segments does not meet any of the conditions for relief. 70 Fed. Reg. at 61500.

12. What does the term “releasing the limits of a main track authority” mean in connection with the EO?
 

The term means releasing all or a portion of the limits (i.e., rolling up the
limits) of an existing main track authority.

13. If a train crew is relieved on line-of-road, must the crew being relieved take the SPAF with them?

The purpose of the EO is to establish responsibility, shared among the crew and the dispatcher, for confirmation that all switches have been restored before the authority is released. A subsequent crew will not have actual knowledge of the position of switches in the track segment(s) utilized by the relieved crew. Further, the declarations made on the SPAF are personal to each employee participating, and it is not possible for subsequent crew members to verify information about which they did not have contemporaneous knowledge. Accordingly, to accomplish the purpose of this EO, the crew being relieved should contact the dispatcher and confirm the position of switches handled, at the same time releasing (rolling up) any
portion of the authority not required by the relieving crew. The crew going off duty would finalize their SPAF at that time. The relieving crew would then initiate a new SPAF.

14. Can an employee responsible for on-track safety, e.g., an employee in charge (EIC), complete the SPAF for all employees working under their jurisdiction?

Yes. The employee responsible for on-track safety, as per the requirements of 49 CFR, Part 214, Subpart C, may maintain the SPAF in lieu of the
individual worker(s) operating switches.

15. If an EIC of on-track safety permits a train into the EIC’s authority limits and there are switches operated by that train crew, what are the SPAF responsibilities in relation to the train?

Both the EIC and the train crew must complete a SPAF.

16. If trains are operating through the limits of an authority and the EIC instructs all trains to operate at restricted speed, does this provide relief for the EIC from completing the SPAF?

No. This is a temporary application of the relevant operating rules for the territory involved.

17. What are the requirements if the limits of a main track authority are rolled up behind a train or on-track-equipment (OTE) by the dispatcher without the train’s or OTE’s knowledge?

In addition to determining the train’s or OTE’s location, the dispatcher must also confirm the position of all switches operated by the employees within the limits being rolled up before the limits are rolled up.

18. If OTE is moving to a work location, what are the SPAF requirements?

The employee that receives the authority will complete the SPAF for all switches operated while under that authority.

19. Do roadway workers who operate a switch have to be qualified on the relevant operating rules for operating a switch, even if they are not the employee completing a SPAF?

Yes.

20. If an employee operates a switch when it is not necessary to receive permission from a dispatcher, is a SPAF required?

Yes.

21. What if a railroad does not identify the track segment by “subdivision”?

The SPAF may show branch, secondary track, or other appropriate designation.

22. May employees use hand or whistle signals in lieu of the radio to communicate when a switch is operated?

Yes. FRA will accept alternate methods of intra-crew communication when they afford an equivalent level of communication integrity relevant to the prevailing operating conditions.

23. Does the EO apply in Rule 251 or GCOR Rule 9.14 territory, i.e., current of traffic, signaled in one direction only?

No.

24. Does the EO apply if the signal system for a track segment is suspended?

Yes.

25. Does the EO apply if the track is out-of-service?

Yes, unless the operating rules or special instructions require trains to approach all facing point hand-operated switches prepared to stop during the entire period the track is out-of-service.

26. What does the term “as soon as practicable” mean regarding entries required on the SPAF before employees leave the location of a switch?

FRA’s expectations are that when employees are in close proximity, that the required SPAF entries will be personally completed by the individual employees themselves before they actually leave the location of the switch. However, FRA recognizes that there are operating conditions which would make recording the required entries on the SPAF before employees leave a location of a switch impracticable due to extreme physical separation. In circumstances such as this, where it is logistically unfeasible and in some situations unsafe to record the required entries on the SPAF before leaving the location of a switch, FRA would allow the crewmember completing the SPAF to make an appropriate entry on the SPAF. An appropriate entry would state that the necessary radio job briefing concerning the switch position was accomplished. Furthermore, the crewmember completing the SPAF should then enter the required employee’s initials for that employee. At that time, FRA will consider the entries on the SPAF for that switch complete.

For example, a conductor reverses a main switch for an intended 100-car shoving movement into a 2-mile industrial lead. After lining the switch, the conductor begins the shoving movement, remaining on the leading end to protect the movement. When the engine clears the switch, the movement stops and the brakeman lines the main track switch to its normal position, and the shoving movement resumes, with the conductor still protecting the leading end of the movement. In this case, it would be impracticable to require the conductor to walk back 100 car-lengths to the engine in order to obtain the brakeman’s initials on the SPAF, and then walk back 100 car lengths to the leading end to continue protecting the movement.

27. If an employee is not performing work that is considered covered service under the hours of service laws, can the act of filling out a SPAF require that the employee be covered?

No, the act of filling out any portion of a SPAF does not by itself trigger covered service.
 

28. For employees that are covered by the hours of service laws, is the act of filling out a SPAF commingled service that should be performed within the statutory period?

Yes. Railroads and employees are responsible for completing all activities required of them within that period.

29. How should the time associated with completion of the SPAF be recorded on the time return or in the hours of service electronic system?

For employees otherwise subject to the hours of service laws, there is no requirement to make a separate entry of the time associated with completion of the form. It is intended that completion of the form be integral to the accomplishment of the work, so it may be considered as part of covered service for hours of service recordkeeping purposes.

 

[4910-06P]


DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
 Federal Railroad Administration

FRA Emergency Order No. 24
[Docket No, FRA-2005-22796, [Notice No. 1]

Emergency Order Requiring Special Handling, Instruction and Testing of Railroad Operating Rules Pertaining to Hand-Operated Main Track switches:

SUMMARY: The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has determined that public safety compels issuance of this Emergency Order (EO) requiring railroads to modify their operating rules and take certain other actions necessary  to ensure that railroad employees who dispatch non-signaled territory or who operate hand-operated main track switches (switches) in non-signaled territory, ensure the switches are restored to their proper (normal) position after use. For purposes of this EO, "employee" means an individual who is engaged or compensated by a railroad or by a contractor to a railroad to perform any of the duties defined in this EO. This E0 is intended to reduce the risk of serious injury or death both to railroad employees and the general public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director, Operating Practices Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW, RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590, (telephone 202-493-6255); or Alan H. Nagler, Senior Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA. 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW RCC- 11I, Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590, (telephone 202-493-6038).

AUTHORITY: Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws his been delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA's safety jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws- 49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103. FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where an unsafe condition or practice "causes an emergency situation involving a hazard of death or personal injury." 49 U.S.C. 20104. These orders may immediately impose. "restrictions and prohibitions . . that may be necessary to abate the situation (Ibid.)

BACKGROUND: FRA's regulations, at 49 (CFR Part 217, require each railroad to instruct its employees on the meaning and application of its code of operating rules, and to periodically test its employees to determine their level of compliance. Railroad operating rules pertaining to the operation of switches provide that the normal position for a main track switch is lined and locked for movement on the main track when not in use. Another related operating rule provides that, where trains or engines are; required to report clear of the main track, such a report must not be made until the switch and derail, if provided, have been secured in their normal position. Where no signal or other system is in service that indicates through wayside or cab signals, or both, the possibility that a main track switch may not be in its normal position, compliance with these railroad operating rules is the critical element in ensuring route integrity for main track movements.

There may be more than one cause that contributes to non-compliance with these important operating rules. One recurrent scenario of non-compliance occurs when a train crew
has exclusive authority to occupy a specific track segment until they release it for other movements and that train crew goes off duty without lining and locking a hand operated main
track switch in its normal position. In that scenario, the train crews mistake in leaving a main track switch lined for movement to a secondary track was the last act or omission that resulted in a catastrophic accident.

During the years 2000 through 2003, railroads reported no more than three accidents per year that were caused by improperly lined hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled
territory and one of the most serious of those wrecks was caused by vandalism. During that four year period, there were ten total injuries, and two fatalities (all to railroad employees).

In comparison, in 2004 there was a sharp increase in the frequency and severity of collisions resulting from improperly lined main track switches as shown on the attached charts.
In 2004, there were a total of eight accidents resulting in eight injuries to railroad employees. The increase in the number of accidents and injuries did not go unnoticed by the industry as some railroads amended their operating rules to address this issue.

On January 6, 2005, the issue of improperly lined main track switches became national news as the media reported on a catastrophic accident that occurred in Graniteville, South
Carolina. This accident. occurred when a Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS) freight train was unexpectedly diverted from the main track onto an industrial lead. The NS train struck a standing train on the industrial lead, derailing the locomotives and 16 cars. The collision resulted in the rupture of a tank car containing chlorine, fatal injuries to eight citizens and one railroad employee, the evacuation of 5,400 local residents, and injuries to 630 people. Damages to equipment and track totaled more than $2.3 million. FRA immediately began deliberating on a course of action to prevent this type of accident. [The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating this accident, and will officially determine the probable cause of the accident which FRA is expressly not doing.]

On January 8, 2005, a BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) freight train was unexpectedly diverted onto an industrial track in Bieber, California. The BNSF train struck two loaded grain
cars. derailing seven locomotives and 14 cars. Two railroad employees were injured. Damages to equipment and track totaled more than $1 million.

FRA decided to start a rulemaking proceeding and took action on January 10, 2005, to abate the safety risks during the proceeding by issuing Safety Advisory 2005-01, Position of
Switches in Non-Signaled Territory (Safety Advisory). The issuance of a safety advisory is an opportunity for the agency to inform the industry and the general public regarding a safety issue, to articulate agency policy, arid to make recommendations. FRA explained in the Safety Advisory that "[a] review of FRAs accident/incident data shows that, overall, the safety of rail transportation continues to improve. However, FRA has particular concern that recent accidents on Class I railroads in non-signaled territory were caused, or apparently caused, by the failure of railroad employees to return manual (hand-operated) main track switches to their normal position, i.e., lined for the main track, after use. As a result, rather than continuing their intended movement on the main track, trains approaching these switches in a facing-point direction were unexpectedly diverted from the main track onto the diverging route, and consequently derailed."

FRA also explained what we could do if-the emergency situation did not abate. That is, in the Safety Advisory, FRA stated that we would consider "the need for any additional action to
address this situation, such as regulatory action or additional advisories. We are considering the form that any additional action might take, its specific content, and any necessary variations based on differing types of operations ... We are committed to taking whatever action appears necessary to prevent any further death or serious injury that might arise from additional failure to comply with the basic operating rules concerning the proper positioning of main track switches."

FRA's decision to make recommendations was based in part on the fact that several railroads had already initiated voluntary actions to enhance the applicable railroad operating rules
during the last few months of 2004. FRA wanted to give all railroads the same opportunity to self-correct in the expectation that it would suffice to ameliorate this problem until, as discussed below, a rule could be issued. Furthermore, the purpose of the Safety Advisory was to heighten employee awareness of the importance of restoring train track switches to their normal position in non-signaled territory. A key element of the Safety Advisory was to promote and enhance intra-crew communication about the operation and position of main track switches.

With the exception of a similar accident that occurred on CSXT Transportation (CSX) Banks, Alabama, on January 11, 2005, one day after publication of the Safety Advisory, and an
accident, with relatively minor results, that was caused by an employee of a contractor to the Nashville and Eastern Railroad (NERR), in Mt. Juliet, Tennessee, on February 23, 2005, there was a respite of nearly six months in accidents resulting from improperly lined main track switches in non-signaled territory. During this respite, FRA began a rulemaking on this subject and other human factor causes of accidents, For about the last decade,, FRA has sought recommendations from its standing Federal advisory committee on most of the subjects on which FRA proposed to issue substantive safety rules. In FRA's view, this process produces better rules because it generates more substantive participation in rulemakings from experts representing both management and labor, and yields better and faster compliance with the final rule from the regulated community which helped craft it. On May 18, 2005, at the first opportunity to address this subject, the Railroad Safety Advisory (RSAC or Committee) agreed to take up the task of reviewing how to reduce human factor caused train
accident/incidents and related employee injuries. The full Committee formed a smaller Operating Rules Working Group (Working Group) comprised of people expert in this subject to
do the bulk of the work in formulating recommendations to complete the task, and a target date of February 10, 2006, was established for the Working Group to report its findings and
recommendations hack to the full RSAC.

Since May. the working Group has met twice and progress toward a consensus recommendation has been made. One of the key elements in those discussions is the proper
operation of main track switches in non-signaled territory. Through the Working Group's activities, FRA has already heard comments on this issue from organizations representing every
affected party within the industry. The. Working Group has three additional meetings scheduled in order to meet the February deadline for recommendations. FRA's goal is to publish a
proposed rule in 2006, and a final rule soon thereafter.

Working with a Federal advisory committee to generate consensus recommendations takes many meetings over a number of months, and rulemaking can take many more months.
During the time it takes to accomplish these tasks, new accidents can occur that require more immediate action, That has happened here. After six months, the Safety Advisory no longer
worked well enough to prevent more accidents.

First, in July 2005, two accidents, with relatively minor results occurred. As the results were minor, and, FRA believed awareness was heightened due to the publication of the Safety
Advisory and the RSAC's activities, FRA did not identify an emergency situation in July. The following is a synopsis of those two accidents.


July 7, 2005 - Willamette Pacific Railroad (WPRR), Sheridan, Oregon - a maintenance of way work train was parked in a siding and the switch was left lined for the siding. A
local height train, operating at a speed of 12 miles per hour (mph), was unintentionally diverted into the siding due to au improperly lilted switch- The freight train struck the lead locomotive of the standing work train. Both locomotives derailed.

July 9, 2005 Dakota, Minnesota and Eastern Railroad (DME), Florence, Minnesota - the crew of-ail eastward BNSF light locomotive consist departing DME property and
returning to BNSF trackage, failed to restore the junction switch to its normal position. Subsequently, an eastward DME train, operating at a speed of 38 mph, encountered an
improperly lined switch. As a result, the lead locomotive derailed and was destroyed.

Beginning six weeks late, three more accidents occurred with more serious results. The three recent accidents described below occurred over a 28-day period and clearly demonstrate the need for additional action beyond the Safety Advisory, as these three collisions, overall, resulted in fatal injuries to one railroad employee, non-fatal injuries to eight additional railroad
employees, an evacuation of civilians, and railroad property damage of approximately two million dollars. Furthermore, each of these accidents could have been worse, as each had the
potential for additional deaths, injuries, property damage or environmental damage. Two of the accidents could have involved catastrophic releases or hazardous materials as these materials were present in at least one of the train consists that collided.

August 19, 2005 - Kansas Oklahoma Railroad (KO), Nickerson, Kansas - an eastward loaded grain train was operating at a speed of 26 mph when it encountered an improperly
lined switch at the west end of the siding. The train struck a standing cut of cars, resulting in the derailment of two locomotives and two freight can. The locomotive
engineer was severely injured.

August 21. 2005 Union Pacific Railroad (UP), Heber, California - an eastward freight train operating at a speed of 30 mph encountered an improperly lined switch at the west end of a siding. The train struck a standing cut of cars, resulting iii the derailment of two locomotives and two freight cars. The control compartment on the lead locomotive was completely destroyed. The three: crew members survived only by quickly throwing themselves on the floor of the locomotive immediately before impact. Considering the destruction to the locomotive control compartment, the crew members likely would have been seriously injured or killed, but for their quick action. The locomotive engineer, conductor and trainman were taken to a local hospital where they were treated and released.

September 15, 2005 UP, Shepherd, Texas - a southward freight train operating at a speed of 36 mph, collided head-on with a northward UP freight train that was standing in
a siding. The collision occurred when the southward train encountered an improperly lined switch at the north end of the siding. The southward train struck the standing train
and derailed two locomotives and 13 cars. The two locomotives and the four leading cars of the standing train were also derailed. The engineer of the standing train was fatally
injured and four other crew members were injured. Eleven of the 13 cars contained hazardous materials. Although. no hazardous materials release occurred. a precautionary
evacuation of 500 people was ordered by local authorities for a period of 12 hours.

Each of the accidents that precipitated the Safety Advisory and this EO either resulted in, or had the potential to result in. serious injuries, fatalities, and catastrophic releases of hazardous
materials. As previously stated, the industry achieved only a temporary respite from accidents of this type after the Safety Advisory's publication, instead of the long-term solution that FRA expected. The sudden and recent occurrence of five of this type of accident is a clear indication that the Safety Advisory has lost its effectiveness. Only with additional action can FRA secure compliance with these important railroad operating rules, FRA considered issuing another Safety Advisory, but that might at best only provide another temporary pause. As described above, FRA is currently seeking a permanent solution through rulemaking. The issuance of this EO is intended to accomplish what the Safety Advisory could not: implement safety practices that will abate the emergency until FRA can complete rulemaking after receiving the RSAC 's expert advice.

FINDING AND ORDER: Collisions, deaths and injuries resulting from improperly lined main track switches began in 2004 to rise very sharply. FRA's issuance of a Safety Advisory in early January 2005, recommending practices designed to prevent such events, led to a nearly six month respite. The sharply rising and accelerating trend of collisions. deaths and injuries resulting from improperly lined main track switches, which the Safety Advisory abated only temporarily, constitutes an emergency situation involving a hazard of death or personal injury which FRA must act to stop.

Even considering the nearly six-month respite from January 12 through July 6, the Nation has experienced more accidents resulting from improperly lined hand operated switches on main
track in non-signaled territory than it experienced in any of the previous five, years. To date in 2005, there were nine accidents resulting in 640 injuries and 10 fatalities. Given the cloud of
chlorine that covered much of Graniteville, South Carolina, on January 6, 2005, as a result of one of these accidents, it is fortuitous that the death toll is not significantly higher; in addition, the same could be said for the Nickerson, Kansas and Shepherd, Texas accidents that occurred on August 19, 2005 and September 15. 2005 respectively as trains involved in those accidents were transporting tank cars containing hazardous materials. Any reasonable extrapolation of the current trends of wrecks, deaths, and injuries makes clear that more accidents of this type will occur in the absence of this EO, that many of those accidents will result in injuries or deaths, or both, that a significant percentage of those wrecks will involve trains carrying hazardous materials, and that each of those wrecks will pose a significant risk that a large amount of hazardous material will be released. Considering the severity of accidents related to improperly lined hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory, the prevalence of hazardous materials on trains in non-signaled territory, and the recent and dramatic increase in the rate of occurrence of these accidents, decisive action is necessary now.

FRA concludes that non-compliance with certain operating rules and practices on the Nation's railroads concerning the proper positioning of hand-operated main track switches in
non-signaled territory lacking the safeguards of facing point protection is a combination of unsafe conditions and practices which causes an emergency situation involving an imminent and
unacceptable hazard of death or personal injury. FRA further concludes that reliance solely on employee compliance with railroad operating rules related in the operation of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory, without a Federal enforcement mechanism, is inadequate to protect the public safety

FRA also considered whether to apply this EO nationwide or limit it to those railroads that have had recent accidents. A review of the 2005 accidents reveals that four major railroads
and four other, smaller railroads were involved in accidents. On June 12., 2004. an alert Amtrak engineer made a full service application of the train brake and stopped three car lengths into a siding, thereby avoiding a potentially serious accident on CSX track in Apex, North Carolina.

Going back to 2000, five additional smaller railroads were involved in accidents. Over the last six years, 41% of this type of accident has had at least one train consist involved that was
carrying hazardous material, i.e., 11 out of 27 accidents. Given the wide distribution of the accidents across various railroads, the similarity of physical conditions and operating practices
among railroads of all sizes nationwide, the high number of new and inexperienced operating employees on many railroads, and the very high potential for serious harm, limiting the EO's
effectiveness to only a small number of railroads would be an unjustifiable risk to public safety and the safety of railroad employees.

Accordingly. pursuant to the authority or- 49 U.S.C. 20104, delegated to me by the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR 1.49), it is hereby ordered that each railroad and its
employees, including employees of a contractor to a railroad, who operate hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory and who dispatch non signaled territory, do, at a
minimum, the following:

(1) Instruction

Each employee subject to this EO shall be instructed on this EO and the railroad's operating rules relating to the operation of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled
territory. The subject matter of the instruction shall include, but not be limited to:

After receiving initial instruction, all employee: must receive periodic instruction, in accordance with 49 CFR 217.11. Railroads shall maintain records of both initial and periodic
instruction available for inspection and copying by representatives of the FRA during normal business hours. These records shall be maintained for a period of at least two years following the end of the calendar year during which the instruction was conducted.


(2)lHand-operated main track switches


Employees operating hand-operated main track switches in non signaled territory shall be qualified on the railroad's operating rules relating to their operation. No employee is permitted
to operate or verify the position of a hand-operated main track switch in non signaled territory unless that person is qualified on the railroad's operating rules relating to their operation.
Employees operating hand operated main track switches in non-signaled territory are individually responsible for the proper operation of these switches, including restoration to their
normal position after use. Employees operating hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory must visually ensure that:

The normal position of a main track switch shall be designated by the railroad and the switch must he lined and locked in that position when not in use, except when the switch is left
in the charge of a crewmember of another train or the train dispatcher directs otherwise. When switches are not being operated, they must be locked. hooked or latched if so equipped.

Before releasing the limits of a main track authority, the employee releasing the limits must report to the train dispatcher that all hand-operated main track switches operated have been
restored to their normal position, unless the train dispatcher directs otherwise. The train dispatcher must confirm the switch positions with the employee releasing the limits before
clearing the limits of the authority. Additionally, in the case of a train, the train dispatcher must confirm that both the conductor and engineer have initialed the SPAF as required.

(3) Switch Point Awareness Form (SPAF)

Employees operating hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled Territory shall complete a SPAF. Employees are individually responsible for the proper completion of these
forms. The form must contain:

Entries made with respect to a specific hand-operated main track switch in non signaled territory must he recorded as soon as practicable after the switch is reversed, and as soon as
practicable after the switch is returned to its normal position before leaving the location. All information required on the SPAF must be entered before an employee reports clear of the limits of the main track authority. SPAFs shall he retained for a period of five days and made available to representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying.

(4) Job Briefings

Job briefings shall he conducted by employees in connection with the operation of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory:

(5) Radio Communication

In the case of a train, each time a crewmember operates, i.e. changes the position of, a hand-operated main track switch in non-signaled territory, the crewmember shall communicate
with the engineer by radio while physically at the switch location, stating the switch name and location, and the position of the switch (normal/reverse). Before movement may occur, the
engineer must acknowledge that information by radio.

If radios become inoperable, all crew members must conduct a job briefing regarding the use of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory before use, noting the
inoperable radio on the SPAF.

(6) Operational tests and inspections

The railroad's program of operational tests and inspections under 49 CFR Part 217 shall be revised as necessary to include the irequirements of this EO, and shall specifically provide for
a minimum number of such tests per year.

(7) Distribution of Emergency Order

A copy of this EO shall be provided to all employees affected by this EO. A written receipt or acknowledgment must he retained permanently for each affected employee.

RELIEF: Petitions for special approval to take actions not in accordance with this EO may be submitted to the Associate Administrator for Safety, who shall be authorized to dispose of those requests without the necessity of amending this EO. In reviewing any petition for special review, the Associate Administrator for Safety shall only grant petitions in which a petitioner has clearly articulated an alternative action that will provide, in the Associate Administrator for Safety's judgment, at least an equivalent level of safety as this EO provides. A copy of this petition should be submitted to the Docket Clerk, Department of Transportation Central Docket Management System, Nassif Building, Room PI-401,400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, DC 20590. The form of such request may be in written or electronic form consistent with the standards and requirements established by the Central Docket Management System and posted on its web site at http://dms.dot.gov.

FRA recognizes that certain railroad operating rules or equipment used by some railroads already provide a level of safety equivalent to this EO. If all of a railroad's hand operated main
track switches in non-signaled territory are covered by one or more of the protective measures identified below, a railroad need not apply for relief from this EO as relief shall be deemed
automatically granted. Relief from this EO is automatically granted when:

PENALTIES: Any violation of this EO shall subject the person committing the violation to a civil penalty of up to $27,000. 49 U.S.C. 21301,28 U.S.C, 2461, and see 69 FR 30591 (May 28, 2004). "Person- is defined by statute to include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals, I U.S.C. L FRA may, through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to enforce this EO. 49 U.S.C. 20112

EFFECTIVE DATE AND NOTICE TO AFFECTED PERSONS: Upon issuance of this EO, railroads shall immediately initiate steps to implement this EO. Railroads shall complete implementation no later than November 22, 2005. Notice of this EO will he provided by publishing it in the Federal Register.

REVIEW: Opportunity for review of this EO will be provided in accordance with .119 U.S.C. 20104 (b) and section 554 of Title 5 of the United States Code. Administrative procedures governing such review arc. found at 49 CFR Part 211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.
Issued iii Washington, D.C. on October 19`h, 2005.


Issued in Washington DC, October 19, 2005,

/s/ Joseph H. Boardman
Administrator