Amendment to the Special Instructions- Failed Equipment Detectors

This letter was sent to all NWE employees from the General Manager as a reaction to an incident in Arizona. We know that all of us already comply with instructions issued in the Special Instructions.

September 30, 2002

Dear Fellow Transportation Professional,

As part of Team BNSF's Leadership Model, we strive to Communicate, Communicate, Communicate, by explaining the "why's." This letter is meant to do just that, by explaining why we recently changed the special instructions regarding actions to be taken after an axle alarm on a Failed Equipment Detector. Before I tell you what we have done with the instructions, lot me first tell you why we made a change.

This past weekend on the Southwest Division near Nelson, Arizona, the crew of a Q-train failed to inspect the designated axis after receiving the exception message from the detector. The conductor failed to inspect the axle and was not even equipped with a temp crayon or a hand-held infra-red testing device. After proceeding from the detector stop, the train derailed eight cars carrying 20 containers and trailers, causing almost $2 million dollars in damage and closing our main line for over 30 hours. Most of the damage was in the loss of lading, which our customers had trusted us to handle on-time and damage-free.

This error made by the train's conductor was not an issue of training or experience. The conductor has 32 years of experience. Exactly why the conductor failed to follow the instructions may never be truly known. Only he knows for sure. Even more disappointing is the fact that this is not the first time this type of a mistake has cost BNSF millions of dollars in losses. In the past three years, we have had similar experiences in Iowa, California and Arizona. Whatever we did as a follow-up to these previous derailments obviously was not enough.

Just to put the damage into context, this derailment cost Team BNSF the equivalent of more than one AC locomotive, more than one mile of new track, more than the annual wages of 25 track personnel, or more than the cost of running 250 trains between Chicago and Los Angeles.

That is the "why" of our actions. The "what' is what most of you have already read In a form C track bulletin or have discussed with a member of the Division Leadership Team. The revision to the special instructions covers four items. If an axle alarm occurs, and the car is not set out of the train, the requirement is:

1 . The conductor will be required to notify the train dispatcher that the noted axle was inspected using either the heat crayon or the hand-held infra-red device, that the axle did not melt the crayon or trigger the infra-red device, and that the 12 axles on either side of the noted axle have also been inspected in the same manner.

2. If the conductor does not have a heat crayon or infra-red device, the train will be secured and a manager will be dispatched to the train. The train will be re-crewed and the conductor will be held accountable for failing to have a heat crayon in possession.

3. The train dispatcher will not allow the train to move unless the required inspection takes place.

4. The engineer will not move the train unless the conductor communicates that the required inspection has been performed.

While most of our Transportation Team has proven they are true professionals in the performance of their duties, an obvious few have caused millions of dollars of damage with incidents that have shut down vital portions of our key corridors due to senseless acts of negligence.

I hope that this explains both the "why's and the "what's" with regard to this rule change. Together, we can eliminate these unnecessary train accidents. I and all of the Division Management team look forward to discussing this with you further in the days ahead.

Yours Truly,

/s/ Don Maze
General Manager