Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
Division 758

Richard E. Etienne
Vancouver, WA
rick@etnsplace.com

October 27, 1999

Richard Etienne
Local Chairman
Forest Grove, OR 97116

Dear Richard,

First of all, let me assure you that empowerment is still alive and well at BNSF. We have attempted to review the voice tapes of the event and have so far been unable to locate the specific conversations. However, I have reviewed your letter and the supporting documents from other employees who overheard the radio conversation.

The BNSF vision statement includes the goal of eliminating accidents and injuries. Part of the process includes the mandatory Operations Testing of employees. Not only is it a federally mandated requirement, but it just makes sense for BNSF to field test employees to insure proper understanding and compliance with safety requirements. Your participation in that process, as the tested employee, gives BNSF the opportunity to recognize a job well done. Also, it gives an opportunity for face to face communication with supervision. I think that is a valuable opportunity, and I trust you share my belief that this is a worthwhile process. In many cases, train delays will occur during the testing process. While delays should be considered when deciding when and where tests should be conducted, the total elimination of delays would no doubt result in invalid tests. That would benefit no one.

In this case the train was tested for various items; dark signal, banner and FED failure, no exception is taken to the methods used to perform the test. System Special Instructions No. 4 makes specific provision on a 5(B) detector readout failure for the train dispatcher or signal maintainer to advise the train crew that the detector is out of service. In so doing, the instructions allow the train to proceed. The testing officers took the fail-safe approach by monitoring the read out while not allowing the train crew to hear it. After the train cleared the detector and attempted the recall code, still failing to get a readout, the train crew was advised by the trainmaster that their train had no defects. While the specific wording required in the System Special Instruction, "that TWD is out of service" may not have been used, the crew was advised that the trainmaster was with the signal maintainer who verified that the train had no defects.

At this point, I want to reiterate the safety of the crew members and the train was not compromised.

The train crew did what they thought was right and did question the instruction to proceed especially in light of the testing scenarios that the crew had just passed. Understandably, they could have taken this instruction as another test scenario. To avoid misunderstanding and misapplication in the future, System Special Instruction 5, Item 8(0), Table No.1- 8(0) Non-Alarm Message, which became effective October 10, 1999, has been changed to allow for the train dispatcher or the signal maintainer to advise "that there are no defects".

We appreciate FRA's involvement in our testing process. This not only gives the FRA an opportunity to view the satisfaction of the regulation, but also gives them hands-on experience in the process. I have difficulty holding the FRA inspector accountable for the manner in which the test was conducted. Their participation cannot be interpreted as their endorsement of the process.

Richard, I want to encourage your continued support of our Operations Testing activities. Operations Testing activities can go a long way in furthering our goal of eliminating incidents and accidents.

Sincerely,

Gregory W. Stengem