Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
Division 758

Richard E. Etienne
Vancouver, WA
rick@etnsplace.com

Ms. Jolene Molitoris
Administrator, FRA
400 Seventh Street, SW
Washington DC 20590

September 30, 1999

Dear Ms. Molitoris,

This letter was sent to Mr. Gregory Stengem, Vice President BNSF Railway regarding abuses performed by carrier officers during operations testing on September 9, 1999. The reason I have forwarded a copy to your office is because, during the operation testing, a FRA representative was present to oversee said operations. This representative observed the attached proceedings, but seemed to find no problem with the way the tests were performed. In fact, the only complaint by the FRA representative was what he considered "excessive chatter on the radio" by other train crews.

This organization has great difficulty understanding how a representative of the FRA would not find any abuse by carrier officers, when train crews are instructed under pain of disciplinary action, to disregard the numerous operating rules and instructions. Then, train crews would be required to violate said rules, just to facilitate the railroad officers when they find their ops tests are causing a delay of trains. Perhaps the carrier officers should have planned their tests more efficiently?

I trust you office will look into this matter, and address the issue of FRA officials taking a lax attitude in enforcing the same rules against railroad officers, that they require train crews to obey.

Respectfully,

Richard E. Etienne

Local Chairman
Div. 758

Mr. Gregory W. Stengem
Vice President,Safety, Training & Op. Support
BNSF Railroad
2600 Lou Menk Drive
Ft. Worth TX 76131

September 27, 1999

Mr. Stengem,

As Advocate of the System SACP, I would like to bring to your attention, practices that have occurred at Vancouver Washington that seem to be in direct conflict with the System SACP Task Force strategic safety plan. Goal 3 states: Establish processes that will ensure adherence with all regulations.

On September 9, 1999, an Ops test was performed on a train crew in the following manner. The crew was eastbound between Vancouver and Pasco. They received an approach signal, and then complying with prevailing rules, came upon a burned out block signal. After complying with all rules and regulations, the crew proceeded, and came upon a banner test. Again, the crew complied with all rules and regulations, and stopped for the banner. Carrier officers came aboard the train, and after this, the crew proceeded east at restricted speed. Upon conversing, per rules and regulations, it was ascertained the FED detector at MP 61.1 failed to give a reading. Per special instructions, item 8, the crew stopped their train, and the conductor proceeded to start a visual inspection of their train.

At this time, a voice came on the radio, and identified him as a trainmaster. He informed the crew they had a print out of the detector and it was safe to proceed. The train crew advised this voice that rules and regulations were quite specific, and they were required to inspect their train. The trainmaster then asked the crew if they were refusing service. This scenario was repeated twice, at which time the train crew, realizing that their career was at the point of jeopardy, notified the dispatcher they were proceeding under protest.

The carrier violated the following rules:

· BNSF Special Instructions, item 8. (This instruction is four pages long, and quite specific. Nowhere in the voluminous instructions are any provisions for disregarding these instructions for an Ops test.)

· GCOR 1.1.1, which states: Maintaining a safe course-" In case of doubt or uncertainty, take the safe course". How safe is it to be ordered under threat of insubordination to violate Special Instructions?

· GCOR 1.4Carrying out Rules and Reporting Violations-" Employees must cooperate and assist in carrying out the rules and instructions. They must promptly report any violations to the proper supervisor. They must also report and condition or practice that may threaten the safety of trains, passengers, or employees, and any misconduct or negligence that may affect the interest of the railroad."

· When this was brought to the attention of the Oregon Division Superintendent, it was vehemently denied that any threats or intimidation took place.

· GCOR 2.12 states: "Fixed Signal Information-Employees must not use the radio to give information to a train or engine crew about the name, position, aspect, or indication displayed by a fixed signal, unless the information is given between members of the same crew, or the information is needed to warn of an emergency".

I ask you this, Mr. Stengem, how can we condone practices that violate rules and regulations, just because a carrier officer says it is OK to do so? I believe carrier officers are employees also, and therefore are bound by the same rules as train crews.

What has happened to the BNSF Safety Vision? What happened to the right to an employee to empower him/herself to discontinue unsafe practices? Here is a voice on the radio ordering them to violate several rules. The crew is in the middle of an Ops test, therefore, how do they know this is not another test? How do they know this is really a trainmaster? Why was the crew ordered under threat of insubordination to do something they were not comfortable with? If the conducting officers were so concerned about delaying trains, why did they pull an Ops test on the first of four trains, thus ensuring a delay to all the rest of the trains? What happened to Empowerment?

Why did the Oregon carrier officers deny any threats occurred? Why was it that the FRA representative was present, and he, also, found no problems with threatening train crews to the point of termination to violate operating rules? Again, what happened to Empowerment? Is this the message your office wants sent to the employees? You are empowered as long as it doesn't inconvenience us? Does this fit into the BNSF Safety Vision?.

Enclosed are copies of four letters from the Engineer involved, plus three other crews that listened to the entire process over the radio. I find it hard to deny the situation actually happened. If your office is truly concerned with attaining goal 3 of the System SACP Task Force strategic safety plans, I believe you need to address this blatant abuse of managerial authority.

Respectfully,

Richard Etienne

Local Chairman
Div. 758

Cc: MW Geiger Jr.
Rupert Tobosa
JL Schollmeyer
J. Molitoris