US Department
400 Seventh St. SW
of Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20590
Federal Railroad
Administration
NOV I 2, 1999
Mr. Richard Etienne
Local Chairman
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
Forest Grove, Oregon 97116
Dear Mr. Etienne:
Thank you for your letter to Federal Railroad Administrator Jolene Molitoris regarding an alleged violation of railroad operating procedures by carrier officials during an operational (efficiency) test that was conducted on the evening of September 9, 1999, on the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) near Stevenson, Washington. I have been asked to respond directly to you on behalf of the Administrator.
The Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) investigation into this matter disclosed that on the above date, a team of BNSF carrier officers did conduct operational tests on passing trains on the Oregon Division, Fallbridge Subdivision, in the vicinity of Stevenson, Washington, between approximately 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. One of the trains tested that evening was eastward BNSF Train B PTLLAC3. The officer testing team consisted of a signal supervisor and three trainmasters. An FRA inspector did accompany the team in order to monitor actual field compliance with BNSF's operational testing program.
Three of the major types of operational tests conducted that evening were: (1) Dark Signal Test - this test monitors alertness of crews to recognize a signal improperly displayed and their compliance with an Approach indication; (2) Restricted Speed Test in Block System Territory -this test determines that train crews comply with all applicable restricted speed rules when operating in block system territory; this involves placing a banner reading "stop" or "stop -obstruction" across the track and requires the train to stop short of it; and (3) Timetable Special Instruction (TTSI) Test - this test is designed to give the testing officer the ability to conduct tests on compliance with any TTSI, in this case, system TTSI No. 8, Trackside Warning Devices (TWD). These devices, also referred to as failed equipment detectors, transmit a radio message to trains passing over them and either announce defects detected in the train, or that there are no defects. The testing procedure is to turn down the radio volume so that the traincrews will not hear the message. The signal supervisor then monitors the TWD to ensure a proper axle count and any other information concerning failed equipment, and relays that information to the trainmaster.
The TTSI test on trackside warning devices was a primary focus of the evening's testing activities due to recent failures by traincrews to follow the recall procedure as required in system TTSI No. 8. That is, if the TWD gives an incomplete radio message, or no message is received, the crew is required to enter the appropriate recall code for the specific detector, and if there is still no message received, the crew is required to stop the train and make a walking inspection of both sides of the entire train (see further discussion below).
On the date in question, Train B PTLLAC3 was tested for all three major types of tests described above. The train complied with all applicable operating rules and procedures concerning all three tests. Concerning the TWD test, after the train had passed over the TWD at mile post 61 and was at a point approximately three miles further east, it had not received a radio message and did initiate the recall procedure several times without success. The crew then stopped their train and again attempted to use the recall procedure.
About this time, a following train (Z PTLCHC) had just passed over the TWD at mile post 61, and either it or Train B PTLLAC3 initiated the recall procedure and the detector did transmit an axle count message, but it was for the following train, Z PTLCHC (as soon as another train passes over the TWD, the radio message will be for that train and the message relating to the previous train is stored). When the signal supervisor realized what had happened, he notified the trainmaster. The trainmaster then notified the crew of Train B PTLLAC3 that an efficiency test had just been performed on their train, that the signal supervisor had monitored the TWD radio message for Train B PTLLAC3 and that there were no defects, that he observed the rear end marker, and that it was okay to proceed east without performing a walking inspection of the train, per the procedures from system TTSI No. 8, Table 1, 5(B), which states that when a signal maintainer advises that the TWD is out of service, the train may proceed. The crew was informed of these conditions by radio by a carrier officer, as further corroborated in your letter.
The signal maintainer and the officers of the testing team, for all practical purposes, considered the TWD to be out of service during the conduct of the efficiency test, since the radio message function was muted. Therefore, under these circumstances, Table 1 intervenes and the appropriate safeguards were in place for Train B PTLLAC3 to have safely proceeded without the crew needing to perform a walking inspection.
The crew of Train B PTLLAC3, however, was applying system TTSI No. 8, Table 3, which requires a walking inspection if no radio message is received. The trainmaster again instructed the train to proceed. When the crew again stated they intended to perform a walking inspection, the trainmaster asked if they were refusing to proceed, and the crew responded that they would proceed, but under protest. The crew then asked for and was given the name of the trainmaster instructing them to proceed. FRA commends the crew's actions for wanting to follow what they believed was the safest course.
I'm sure you know that BNSF's system special instructions were recently reissued (October 10, 1999), with valuable input from employees utilizing the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program. The language in system TTSI No. 8, Table 1, was purposely changed to accommodate efficiency testing when signal maintainers are present. The special instruction now reads . when advised by signal maintainer or train dispatcher that there are no defects.. ." the train may proceed.
Admittedly, in this case, it was the trainmaster, not the signal maintainer, who advised that it was safe for the train to proceed. BNSF management assured FRA that in the future, when conducting efficiency tests under these circumstances, only the signal maintainer or train dispatcher may advise a train that there are no defects, strictly in accordance with the new system TTSI No. 8, Table 1. Notwithstanding, the officers directly involved with the TWD test on Train B PTLLAC3 that evening correctly believed, after consultation with other testing officers and senior management, that they were properly applying system TTSI No. 8, particularly since the primary thrust of the test was to ensure that crews were following the recall procedure, when required.
As I am sure you are aware, the FRA requires railroads to periodically conduct operational (efficiency) tests and inspections to determine the extent of employee compliance with its operating rules, timetables, and special instructions. By regulation, railroads must also provide for testing under various operating conditions, which includes testing for signal and TWD failures.
Based on the foregoing, FRA did not develop any evidence to support the premise that safety was compromised during the TWD efficiency test conducted on Train B PTLLAC3. FRA takes no exception to the BNSF's operational testing practices described above and, in fact, supports operational testing in this area when it is done responsibly and in accordance with FRA guidelines. Again we commend the train crew for the safe and professional manner in which they responded to this test.
Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention and I look forward to working with you on other rail safety issues that are of importance to you and your members.
Sincerely,
George Gavalla
Associate Administrator
for Safety